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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
HERLINDA RESENDIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NOS. 45006, 45007, 45008 & 45009
BANNOCK COUNTY
NOS. CR 2010-8092, CR 2010-18759,
CR 2011-6763 & CR 2016-7938

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In these consolidated appeals, Herlinda Resendiz appeals from the district court’s orders
revoking her probation and from her judgment of conviction for delivery of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine.

She asserts that the district court abused its discretion by

imposing an excessive sentence and by executing Ms. Resendiz’s sentences.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
While on probation in three cases (Docket Numbers 45006, 45007, and 45008),
Ms. Resendiz was charged with two counts of delivery of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine.

(R., p.446.)

The State also filed a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., p.448.) In that case, Pocatello Police were contacted by a confidential informant who stated
that Ms. Resendiz was in possession of methamphetamine that was for sale.

(2/20/17

Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) A controlled purchase was arranged
and the informant purchased 2.27 grams of methamphetamine. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Resendiz stated
that this was a one-time incident, and that she sold the informant methamphetamine because he
said he needed money to buy his children Christmas gifts. (PSI, p.3.)
Ms. Resendiz pleaded guilty to one count and the State dismissed the other count as well
as the persistent violator enhancement. (R., p.515.) At the same time she pleaded guilty, she
admitted to violating her probation in the other three cases. (R., pp.141, 272, 375.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, for
the delivery of a controlled substance charge in Docket Number 45009. (R., p.536.) In Docket
Number 45006, the district court revoked probation and executed a unified sentence of five
years, with two years fixed, for grand theft by possession of stolen property. (R., p.148.) In
Docket Number 45007, the district court revoked probation and executed a unified sentence of
five years, with two years fixed, for burglary. (R., p.276.) In Docket Number 45008, the district
court revoked probation and executed a unified sentence of seven years, with three fixed, for
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. (R., p.380.) Ms. Resendiz appealed in
all four cases. (R., pp.152, 280, 384, 545.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and by executing
Ms. Resendiz’s sentences?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence And By
Executing Ms. Resendiz’s Sentences
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Resendiz’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. Accordingly, to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Resendiz
“must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable
view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
Further, this Court uses a two-step analysis to review a probation revocation proceeding.
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the Court determines “whether the defendant
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violated the terms of his probation.” Id. Second, “[i]f it is determined that the defendant has in
fact violated the terms of his probation,” the Court examines “what should be the consequences
of that violation.” Id. The determination of a probation violation and the determination of the
consequences, if any, are separate analyses. Id.
Here, Ms. Resendiz does not challenge her admission to violating her probation. “When a
probationer admits to a direct violation of her probation agreement, no further inquiry into the
question is required.” State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992). Rather, Ms. Resendiz
submits that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her probation.
“After a probation violation has been proven, the decision to revoke probation and
pronounce sentence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Roy, 113 Idaho
388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987). “A judge cannot revoke probation arbitrarily,” however. State v. Lee,
116 Idaho 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1989). “The purpose of probation is to give the defendant an
opportunity to be rehabilitated under proper control and supervision.” State v. Mummert, 98
Idaho 452, 454 (1977). “In determining whether to revoke probation a court must consider
whether probation is meeting the objective of rehabilitation while also providing adequate
protection for society.” State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995). The court may
consider the defendant’s conduct before and during probation. State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392
(Ct. App. 1987).
Ms. Resendiz addressed the district court at the sentencing/disposition hearing. She
stated,
I just want to take full responsibility for my actions. When I got out of the rider
[for my previous cases] I did four years of really good probation, no sanctions, no
PCs. I did relapse, and for that I’m very sorry. And I would just ask the court to
give me a chance at a rider, and to give me programming and continued help after
I get back, stay in programming and counseling and treatment.
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(Tr., p.7, L.19 – p.8, L.1.) Counsel requested that the court place Ms. Resendiz on a rider.
(Tr., p.6, Ls.5-9.) Specifically, counsel argued:
Her last rider was in 2011, which is six years ago, Your Honor. And I think that
protection of society, rehabilitation, all the goals of sentencing will best be served
by giving [Ms. Resendiz] another chance at a rider. It will help facilitate some
additional treatment in a new program, the Cincinnati Drug Treatment program,
that she hasn’t had the benefit of. She’s older. She’s in a different place in her
life. I think she’s going to be more susceptible to receiving some additional inpatient treatment. And I think with that treatment she’ll be in a better position to
go forward in the community and be sober and be successful on probation.
(Tr. p.6, Ls.5-17.) Further, counsel suggested, “if [Ms. Resendiz] is successful on a rider, she
could look at reapplying to Wood Court. And that may answer some of the concerns.” (Tr., p.8,
Ls.10-14.)
Considering that Ms. Resendiz accepted responsibility and had done well on probation
prior to a relapse, as well as the fact that she wanted additional treatment, Ms. Resendiz submits
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and by executing
her remaining sentences.

She submits that a rider would better accomplish the goals of

sentencing.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Resendiz respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 20th day of November, 2017.

___________/s/______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of November, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in
the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
HERLINDA RESENDIZ
INMATE #99095
C/O BONNEVILLE COUNTY
SHERIFF'S OFFICE
605 N CAPITAL AVENUE
IDAHO FALLS ID 83402
STEPHEN S DUNN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
TAWNYA R HAINES
BANNOCK COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JMC/eas

6

